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Case No. 20080243-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

KENDALL ROSELL SWENSON,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for two counts of burglary, two counts of
criminal mischief, one count of theft, two counts of theft by receiving stolen
property, and one count of manufacturing or possessing burglary tools. This Court
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Defendant appealed the judgment in this case, and this Court held that it
lacked jurisdiction because the appeal was untimely. Following that decision, the
trial court entered an amended judgment to correct an inadvertent error in the
original judgment. Did the amended judgment restart defendant's time for filing an
appeal from his convictions?

Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue.
2. Did the trial court err when it denied defendant's motion to dismiss for
alleged violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers?
Standard ofReview. "A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is a question
of law which [this Court] review[s] for correctness giving no particular deference to
the trial court's legal conclusions." State v. Krueger, 1999 UT App 54, % 10,975 P.2d
489.
3. Did the trial court err when it denied defendant's motion to suppress?
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. The trial court's legal conclusions are
reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ^ 11,15,103
P.3d 699, and its underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error, State v.
Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, % 11,100 P.3d 1222.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant provisions are reproduced in Addendum A:
U.S. Const, amend. IV
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (West 2004)
Utah R. App. P. 4(a)
Utah R. Crim. P. 30
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession or use of a controlled substance,
burglary, criminal mischief, possession of drug paraphernalia, theft, theft by
receiving stolen property, and unlawful possession of burglary tools. Rl-3.
Defendant filed several motions, including a motion to dismiss for alleged violations
of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and a motion to suppress evidence found
in defendant's vehicle. R94,99. The trial court denied those motions. R349:7,49;see
also R350:87~89. The trial court conducted a jury trial, and the jury returned verdicts
finding defendant guilty on eight of ten counts. R237-240. On count 8, the jury
found defendant guilty of theft by receiving stolen property, a class B misdemeanor.
R237-39 (jury verdict) (reproduced in Addendum B).
On March 14,2007, the court entered judgment, sentencing defendant to six
concurrent indeterminate terms of zero to five years on six convictions for third
degree felonies and to two concurrent jail terms on two misdemeanor convictions.
R320. In so doing, the court listed defendant's two convictions of theft by receiving
stolen property, counts 8 and 9, as third degree felonies, R320, where the verdict
form listed count 9 as a third degree felony but count 8 as only a class B
misdemeanor. R238.
On March 11,2008, almost one year later, defendant filed his notice of appeal.
R376.
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Just before midnight on August 16, 2006, police officer Brad Hansen,
responded to a burglary alarm at the Logan Top Spot convenience store. Upon
arriving, he encountered defendant in the store's parking lot. R349:14-16, 18.
Defendant was running from the northwest door and said that he was jogging.
R349:17.

Officer Hansen, aware of many false alarms, allowed defendant to

continue on his way. R349:16.
Almost immediately, however, Officer Hansen discovered burglary tools near
the northwest door of the store and found that the door's lock had been popped.
R349:16-18. He looked around for defendant and saw that defendant had climbed
into the cab of a semi-truck parked in the car wash lot just east of the Top Spot.
R349:18, 36. Officer Hansen approached the truck, and defendant jumped out,
saying, "I didn't do it. I didn't do it." R349:19.
Back-up arrived, and Officer Hansen left defendant with Officer Ostermiller.
R349:20. Officer Ostermiller began getting defendant's information and ran a
warrants check. R349:20, 22.
Officer Hansen and a second back-up officer returned to the Top Spot,
seeking additional evidence. R349:20. Officer Hansen walked over to the truck,
stepped up onto the driver's door area, and looked in through the open driver's

4

window. R349:20. He saw miscellaneous tools in the passenger cab, including a
gas-powered chop saw. R349:20-22.
Officer Hansen then returned to defendant, telling him that he was being
detained for a possible burglary. R349:22. At that point, Officer Ostermiller told
Officer Hansen that he had located an outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest.
R349:22.

The officers arrested defendant and transported him to the police

department. R349:22-23.
Prior to impounding the truck, police performed an inventory search.
R349:36-37. Burglary tools were found in the cab of defendant's truck, as was
evidence of criminal activity at other locations. R349:37-40. Additional facts are set
forth in the portion of the brief addressing defendant's challenge to the denial of his
motion to suppress. See Point III, below.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
,

1. This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear defendant's appeal. The trial court

entered judgment on March 14, 2007. Defendant filed his first notice of appeal on
April 20, 2007. In an earlier case, this Court held that defendant's notice of appeal
was not timely. Moreover, this Court also held that a July 30,2007 addendum to the
judgment did not restart the time for filing a notice of appeal.

5

On February 12, 2008, the district court filed an amended judgment. The
amended judgment corrected a clerical error and an illegal sentence. It did not,
however, restart the time for filing an appeal.
2. The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss for an
alleged violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.

The Interstate

Agreement on Detainers, which provides rules "to encourage the expeditious and
orderly disposition of . . . charges [outstanding in one jurisdiction against a
defendant imprisoned in another jurisdiction]" did not apply to any matter in this
case. Defendant was not detained on the basis of outstanding charges in another
jurisdiction.
3. The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress. Assuming
that defendant was subject to a search governed by the Fourth Amendment, the
search was permissible under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
Evidence discovered was also admissible because defendant's arrest on an
outstanding warrant provided an independent lawful basis for a post-arrest truck
search. His arrest provided grounds for a lawful search incident to arrest, and the
need to impound his vehicle provided grounds for a lawful inventory search.

6

ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION AND MUST DISMISS
THIS APPEAL BECAUSE THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS NOT
TIMELY
Defendant did not timely file his notice of appeal, and this Court therefore
lacks jurisdiction to hear it.
Proceedings below. Defendant filed three notices of appeal in this case.
He filed notices of appeal from the judgment, from an addendum to the
judgment, and from an amended judgment.
Judgment. On March 14, 2007, the trial court entered its judgment. R319
(reproduced in Addendum C). In listing the charges and convictions in the final
judgment and sentence, the trial court correctly recorded that the jury had found
defendant guilty on count 8, theft by receiving stolen property, but erroneously
recorded it as a third degree felony rather than as a class B misdemeanor. Compare
R238 with R319. The court therefore imposed the statutory indeterminate term for a
third degree felony, rather than the term for a class B misdemeanor. R320.
Defendant filed an untimely pro se notice of appeal from this judgment on
April 20, 2007. R327.
Addendum to judgment. On July 30, 2007, the trial court entered an
"addendum to sentence, judgment, commitment/7 R344 (reproduced in Addendum
7

D). The addendum noted that "[t]he Defendant has a pending Federal case, or is on
Federal Parole any details of which this Court is uninformed/'

R344.

The

addendum stated that "[t]his Court had at the time of sentencing expressed the
intention that this sentence is to run concurrent with any Federal cou[n]t. This
Order is in clarification that the state's case is not to run consecutive to any
proceedings by the Federal authorities and that this sentence can be served
concurrent at any applicable Federal institution or the Utah State Prison/ 7 R345.
On August 15,2007, defendant filed an amended notice of appeal, appealing
from the order entered on July 30, 2007. R347.
Dismissal of appeal. On November 1,2007, this Court dismissed defendant's
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See State v. Swenson (Swenson I), 2007 UT App 359U
(reproduced in Addendum E). The Court reasoned that defendant had only thirty
days after the entry of the March 14,2007 judgment within which to appeal. Id. The
Court noted that defendant had filed his notice of appeal on April 20, 2007, thirtyseven days after the entry of his sentence and outside the time to appeal. Id.
This Court also addressed defendant's argument that the July 30, 2007
addendum to his sentence re-started the time for his appeal and that his second
notice of appeal was therefore timely. Id. This Court held that the addendum did
not constitute a material change in the judgment, but merely clarified the substance
of the judgment, and therefore did not enlarge the time for appeal. Id.
8

Amended judgment. On February 12, 2008, following remittitur, the trial
court entered "amended minutes —sentence, judgment, commitment/' R370-73
(reproduced in Addendum F); see also R370-71 ("minutes— in court note"). The
amended judgment had only two changes. First, the amended judgment listed the
conviction on count 8, theft by receiving stolen property, as a class B misdemeanor.
R372. Thus, the court corrected the mistake inadvertently included in the original
judgment, which listed count 8 as a third degree felony even though the verdict
form listed it as a class B misdemeanor. Second, the amended judgment reduced
the fine and surcharge on the conviction from the maximum allowable amount for a
third degree felony to the maximum allowable amount for a class B misdemeanor.
See R375; see also Utah Code Ann. § 51-9-401 (West Supp. 2008) (surcharges); Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (West 2004) (indeterminate terms for felony convictions); Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-204 (West 2004) (terms for misdemeanor convictions); Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-301 (West 2004) (fines); Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-601 (West Supp. 2008)
(security surcharge).
These were the only changes. The court simply copied the original judgment,
made the two changes, and signed the amended minutes on February 12,2008. See
R372-75.
Defendant filed "a notice of appeal of his sentence, judgment and
conviction" on March 11, 2008. R376. He apparently relies on that notice of
9

appeal in invoking the court's jurisdiction to review the claims he now brings on
appeal. See id. His appeal, however, does not assert that the trial court erred in
amending the judgment. Rather, defendant attacks his conviction, claiming that
the trial court erred in its October 2006 pretrial rulings. See Br. Appellant at 8-21.
Relevant law. A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of
final judgment. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). In a criminal case, the entry of a sentence
constitutes the final order. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, f 4,57 P.2d 1065. Thus,
"the [thirty]-day period for filing [a] notice of appeal in a criminal case . . . is
jurisdictional and cannot be enlarged by [the appellate] [c]ourt."

Id. at ^f 5

(quotation and citation omitted).
"The rule governing amended judgments in Utah is well settled." Swenson I,
2007 UT App 359U. Substantive modifications of the judgment enlarge the time for
appeal, but minor or non-substantive modifications do not. See State v. Garner, 2005
UT 6, f 11, 106 P.3d 729 (where a judgment is modified or amended "in some
material matter, the time begins to run from the time of the modification or
amendment"; where the amendment or modification does not "chang[e] the
substance or character of the judgment," the amendment or modification "relates
back to the time the original judgment was entered, and does not enlarge the time
for appeal") (quotation and citation omitted).

10

The criminal rules provide for the correction of certain errors at any time.
Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b) governs clerical error, and Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) governs
illegal sentences.
Clerical error, "Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the
record and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected
at any time . . . . " Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b). "A clerical error, as contradistinguished
from judicial error, is not the deliberate result of the exercise of judicial reasoning
and determination. ,, State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388,1389 (Utah 1988) (citation and
quotation omitted). "To ascertain the clerical nature of the mistake, [a reviewing
court] will look to the record to harmonize the intent of the court with the written
judgment/ 7 Id. The correction of a clerical error "merely constitutes an amendment
or modification not changing the substance or character of the judgment." Gamer,
2005 UT 6, Tf 11 (citation and quotation omitted). The entry of the correction is
therefore "merely a nunc pro tunc entry which relates back to the time the original
judgment was entered." Swenson 1,2007 UT App 359U, quoting Gamer, 2005 UT 6, %
11 (citation and quotation omitted). Such an amendment is "not sufficient to enlarge
the time to appeal." Id.
Illegal sentences. "The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). "[A] rule
22(e) illegal sentence is a 'patently 7 illegal sentence or a "manifestly illegal
11

sentence." State v ThorMson, 2004 UT App 9, \ 15, 84 P.3d 854 (quoting State v.
Brooks, 908 R2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995), and State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, | 5,48 R 3 d
228). "A 'patently 7 or 'manifestly' illegal sentence generally occurs in one of two
situations: (1) where the sentencing court has no jurisdiction, or (2) where the
sentence is beyond the authorized statutory range." Id. (citation omitted). "[A]n
appellate court may not review the legality of a sentence under rule 22(e) when
the substance of the appeal is . . . a challenge, not to the sentence itself, but to the
underlying conviction." Brooks, 908 P.2d at 859.
Analysis.

In this case, two errors occurred in the original March 14, 2007

judgment. See R319-22. The trial court corrected both errors in its February 12,
2008 amended judgment. See R372-75. As explained below, the correction of the
clerical error did not restart the time for an appeal. Moreover, the correction of
the illegal sentence provided no basis for review of the claims defendant now
raises, which are challenges, not to the new sentence, but to the underlying
conviction.
Clerical error. The first error occurred when the trial court entered the
conviction on count eight for a third degree felony, rather than for a class B
misdemeanor. In preparing the March 14, 2007 "minutes — sentence, judgment,
commitment," the court clerk inadvertently listed the conviction on count 8 as a
third degree felony, despite the jury verdict finding a class B misdemeanor. See
12

R319. The trial court, not recognizing the error, signed the document, entering an
erroneous judgment. See R322.
This was a clerical error. See United States v. Diaz, 190 F.3d 1247,1252 (11th
Cir. 1999) (error in entering judgment for wrong crime was clerical error); BowieMyles v. United States, 2006 WL 2092286, *3 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (unpublished)
(reproduced in Addendum G) (error in entering judgment for wrong crime was
"clerical in nature," a "scrivener's error"). The clerk who recorded count 8 as a third
degree felony merely mistranscribed the information on the verdict form when
preparing the amended judgment. The trial court, not realizing the error, signed the
document. The error "ar[ose] from oversight or omission." Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b).
The error was "not the deliberate result of the exercise of judicial reasoning and
determination." State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Utah 1988) (citation and
quotation omitted).
Thus, the trial court acted properly when it corrected the error. The amended
judgment entered on February 12, 2008 "merely constitutes an amendment or
modification not changing the substance or character of the judgment," and "is
merely a nunc pro tunc entry which relates back to the time the original judgment
was entered." Swenson I, 2007 UT App 359U, quoting Garner, 2005 UT 6, f 11
(citation and quotation omitted).
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This amendment, the correction of a clerical error, was "not sufficient to
enlarge the time to appeal/ 7 See id.; see also United States v. Vortillo, 363 F.3d 1161,
1164-66 (11th Cir. 2004) (clerical error in judgment can be corrected at any time
under rule 36, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but correction does not restart
period of time for appealing other matters).
Illegal sentence. The second error occurred when the trial court imposed the
statutory indeterminate sentence for a third degree felony on count 8. The sentence
was a legal sentence for a third degree felony conviction, but not a legal sentence for
a class B misdemeanor. Once the court corrected the degree of the conviction of
count 8, the illegality of the sentence imposed in the original judgment became
apparent. That sentence was patently or manifestly illegal because the sentence was
"beyond the authorized statutory range" for a class B misdemeanor. Thorkelson,
2004 UT App 9, f 15 (citation omitted).
Because the sentence was an illegal sentence, the trial court had jurisdiction to
correct that sentence. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). The trial court corrected the illegal
sentence when it entered its February 12, 2008 amended judgment sentencing
defendant "to a term of 180 day(s)" on the class B misdemeanor count of theft by
receiving stolen property. See R374.
But the trial court's correction of the illegal sentence does not provide
grounds for review of his conviction on appeal.
14

Utah Appellate courts have

consistently held that "an appellate court may not 'review the legality of a sentence
[under rule 22(e)] when the substance of the appeal is, as it is here, a challenge, not
to the sentence itself, but to the underlying conviction/" See State v. Finlayson, 2000
UT10, | 8,994 P.2d 1243 (quoting Brooks, 908 P.2d at 859); see also State v. Babbel, 813
P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1991).
Here, defendant moved for a correction in the judgment to reflect that his
sentence on count 8 was for a misdemeanor. See R360-62. The court granted that
motion, corrected the error, and imposed a new sentence within the legal
parameters for the misdemeanor conviction. Defendant may not obtain review of
his claim regarding alleged violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers or
his claim that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress by appealing
from the trial court's order imposing the new and legal sentence. As explained, an
appellate court may not review an appeal from an order regarding an illegal
sentence "'when the substance of the appeal is, as it is here, a challenge, not to the
sentence itself, but to the underlying conviction/" Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ^ 8,
quoting Brooks, 908 P.2d at 860. Defendant's claims are challenges not to his
sentence, but to his underlying conviction.
In sum, defendant's claims on appeal challenge his conviction. Defendant
could have raised these claims by filing a notice of appeal within 30 days of the
March 14, 2007 judgment entering his convictions. He did not. He cannot now
15

appeal these matters in the context of an appeal from the trial court's correction of a
clerical error because the correction of a clerical error does not restart the time for
appeal. Neither can he appeal them in the context of an appeal from the correction
of an illegal sentence, as his challenge is not to the new sentence, but to his
conviction.
Because defendant did not timely file his original appeal and because he has
no other avenue for appeal, this Court must dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.

n.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS; THE STATE DID NOT VIOLATE THE
INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS
Even if this Court decides that it has jurisdiction, it must affirm defendant's
conviction because his underlying claims are without merit. Defendant first asserts
that "this Court should dismiss this action7' because "the State violated the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers [IAD]." Br. Appellant at 9,14 (boldface and capitalization
omitted). Defendant appears to claim that the State obtained custody of defendant
through the Agreement, but violated the Agreement, including its anti-shuttling
provisions. See id. at 8-19. As a consequence, defendant asserts, the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to address the charges or that, even assuming jurisdiction, the
trial court should have dismissed the charges with prejudice. See id. In making
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these claims, defendant misapprehends both defendant's custody status and the
reach of the IAD.
Proceedings below. On August 24,2006, defendant posted bond to guarantee
that he would appear at the hearings in his case. R19. On January 28, defendant
failed to appear. R20-21. The trial court noted on the record that it had received a
facsimile from Salt Lake County indicating that defendant had been booked on
several felonies and misdemeanors on August 27 and was "currently [being held] in
[the] S.L.A.D.C. [without] bail." R22. The trial court then issued a no-bail bench
warrant for defendant's arrest. R21. Defendant was transported from Salt Lake
County and appeared before the trial court on September 12. R31. The court
recalled the warrant and reinstated defendant's bail. R31. On September 13, the
Cache County jail received a federal hold or detainer, asking the jail to notify the
federal marshal before releasing defendant because defendant was wanted on an
arrest warrant charging him with violating the conditions of his parole on a federal
offense. R129. The federal hold specifically noted that the requirements of the IAD
did not apply to this detainer. Id.
On October 17,2006, defendant filed a "motion to dismiss [the charges against
him] for lack of jurisdiction for the State's failure to comply with the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers." R99. In his supporting memorandum, see R100-43,
defendant made the claims that are now reproduced almost verbatim in his brief on
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appeal. Compare Rl00-10 with Br. Appellant at 8-19. He claimed that when his bail
was reinstated, he was entitled to release from the jail and that he was thereafter
held in the jail only because the federal marshal had sent the hold to the jail
personnel. See R106. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied the
motion. R145; see also R349:2-7 (argument and ruling on motion). The court ruled
that defendant remained in state custody, even when he was out on bail, and that
the federal hold did not transfer him to federal custody because it only requested
notification prior to defendant's release so that federal authorities might then
assume custody.

R349:2-7.

Before sentencing, the trial court entered a

memorandum decision memorializing its denial of the motion to dismiss. R312.
Analysis. Defendant's claim fails. Defendant was in State custody at all times
relevant to this case and not subject to the requirements of the IAD.
History and purpose of the IAD, Congress enacted the IAD in 1970, joining
the Unites States as a "member State" or party to the Agreement. United States v.
Mauro, 436 U.S. 340,343 (1978); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (West 2004). Utah
became a party to the agreement in 1980. See 1980 Utah Laws 188; see also Utah
Code Ann. § 77-29-5. The Agreement "is designed 'to encourage the expeditious
and orderly disposition of . . . charges [outstanding against a prisoner] and
determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried
indictments, informations, or complaints.'" Mauro, 436 U.S. at 343 (quoting Art. I of
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the Agreement). "It prescribes procedures by which a member State may obtain for
trial a prisoner incarcerated in another member jurisdiction and by which the
prisoner may demand the speedy disposition of certain charges pending against
him in another jurisdiction/'

Id. But, in either case, "the provisions of the

Agreement are triggered only when a 'detainer' is filed with the custodial (sending)
State by another State (receiving) having untried charges against the prisoner." Id.
"Article IV(e) requires the dismissal of the indictment against a prisoner who is
obtained by a receiving State if he is returned to his original place of imprisonment
without first being tried on the indictment underlying the detainer and request by
which custody of the prisoner was secured." Id. at 345 n.4; see also Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-29-5. This provision "demonstrates a concern of the Agreement that prisoners
not be shuttled back and forth between penal institutions" in different jurisdictions.
Id. at 361 & n.26.
Defendant's claims. Defendant claims that he was in federal custody when
the State brought him to court, even though he was at that time incarcerated in the
Cache County jail. See Br. Appellant at 14. He argues that although he had been
incarcerated at the Cache County jail on the charges in this case, he had posted bail,
was entitled to release, was held in jail only because federal authorities had placed a
hold on his release, and was therefore no longer in state custody but rather in
federal custody. See id. He claims that because he was in federal custody, the State
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should have filed a detainer with the federal government and obtained temporary
custody before bringing him to trial. See id. at 14-15. Defendant also claims that
because he was in federal custody, the State had to follow the provisions of the IAD
to secure his attendance at state court proceedings. See id. He apparently argues
that each time he was returned to the Cache County jail following a court
appearance, he was returned to federal custody, thus violating the provisions of the
IAD that proscribe shuttling of a defendant between the custody of one jurisdiction
and the custody of another. See id. at 16-17.
A. Defendant was not in federal custody.
Defendant cites no authority to support his theory that he was in federal
custody. Defendant's argument rests of the premise that a defendant being held by
a state institution upon the request of a federal marshal is in federal custody.
Defendant cites no authority for this underlying claim. For that reason alone, his
argument is inadequately briefed and this Court should decline to review his claim.
See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring citation to record and authorities); State v.
Thomas, 1999 UT 2, | 11-13, 974 P.2d 269 (stating that rule requires "substantive
analysis''); State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^ 8,1 P.3d 1108 (providing that briefs may
be disregarded or stricken for failure to comply with rule 24).
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B. The federal government had not filed a detainer under the
IAD.
Moreover, defendant's claim—that the federal government had filed a
detainer under the IAD that should have transferred him to federal custody —is
contrary to the provisions of the IAD and without support. The federal government
had filed a detainer/hold with the Cache County jail, but not a detainer governed
by the IAD. The IAD addresses detainers lodged against a prisoner in order to
bring that prisoner to trial on an indictment, information, or complaint in another
jurisdiction that is pending during the defendant's prison term. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-29-5, art. III. It does not address holds for other purposes, such as the purpose
for the federal marshal's hold in this case, i.e., to give the federal government
opportunity to take custody of the defendant if and when a state institution decides
to release him. See Mauro, 436 U.S. at 343 (stating that IAD applies only to transfers
made to permit the prosecution of "untried charges pending against the prisoner");
State v. Kahl, 814 P.2d 1151,1152 n.l (Utah App 1991) ("Detainers based on alleged
parole or probation violations . . . are not based on untried charges and thus the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers is inapplicable.").
The detainer filed by the federal marshal in this case specifically advised that
"[t]he notice and speedy trial requirements of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
do NOT apply to this detainer, which is based on a Federal probation/supervised
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release violation warrant.'7 R129 (federal hold) (capitalization and boldface in
original) (reproduced in Addendum H). The hold did not request a transfer to
federal custody, but advised that "[t]he United States District Court for the District
of UTAH has issued an arrest warrant charging the subject with violation of the
conditions of probation a n d / o r supervised release" and asked that the jail, "[p]rior
to the subject's release from [its] custody/' notify the United States Marshal's office
"so that we may assume custody if necessary." Id. Thus, nothing in the detainer
suggested that the federal government had taken custody of defendant at the Cache
County jail. Nothing suggests that the marshal's hold had effected a transfer of
defendant from state to federal custody.
C. Defendant was in state custody because he no longer qualified
for release on his state charges.
Defendant, in fact, was not held at the jail because he had been transferred to
federal custody, but because he no longer qualified for bail on his state charges.
Under statutory law, a person may not be admitted to bail as a matter of right if he
is charged with a "felony committed while on probation or parole . . . when the
court finds there is substantial evidence to support the current felony charge." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-20-l(l)(b) (West 2004). The court stayed defendant's bond when it
learned of the federal hold, which advised the court of defendant's status as a
parolee. R38. At a subsequent hearing, the court found "substantial evidence of
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crime [i.e., the criminal activity charged in this case] committed while on parole [in
the federal case]/' found that the evidence sufficed to bind defendant over on the
charges in this case, and revoked defendant's bail. R44.1
As explained, a defendant is not entitled to release on bail where a court has
determined that substantial evidence exists to show that the defendant has
committed a state felony while on parole. The court denied release for that reason,
not because defendant was in federal custody.
D. Defendant was not "shuttled" between jurisdictions in
violation of the IAD.
One purpose of the IAD is to prevent a defendant's being unnecessarily
"shuttled" back and forth between jurisdictions. Where a defendant is removed
from prison in one state and sent to another state to face trial on pending charges
and trial is not held on those charges prior to "the return of the prisoner to the
original place of imprisonment," such charges must be dismissed with prejudice.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5, art. 111(e).
Defendant apparently claims that he was shuttled back and forth between
Utah courts and federal custody in violation of the IAD when, at the close of each

1

Defendant has not included transcripts of these hearings in the record on
appeal. The State therefore can provide no further details on the trial court's
analysis.
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day of court proceedings, he was taken from the county courthouse to the Cache
County jail and then back to the county courthouse for the next day of proceedings. 2
This claim rests on defendant's presumption that he was in federal custody at the
Cache County jail. As explained, defendant was not in federal custody at the Cache
County jail simply because the federal marshal had requested notification before
defendant's release from that facility. Defendant's anti-shuttling claim fails because
defendant never left state custody. He cannot show that when the State returned
him to the Cache County jail following his various court appearances, the State
returned him to federal custody and violated the provisions of the IAD.
E. Utah courts had jurisdiction to try defendant.
Finally, defendant claims that a violation of the IAD deprives a court of
jurisdiction. See Br. Appellant at 9,15. Defendant provides no authority for this
claim. While, under carefully delineated circumstances not present in this case, a
violation of the IAD may require that a case be dismissed with prejudice, nothing in
the IAD can be read to strip a court of jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5.
Rather, as Utah courts have observed, "rights created by the IAD [] are statutory,

2

Defendant has set forth no authority to show that trial in a state court of a
defendant held in federal custody within the same state violates the IAD. Because
defendant has not shown that he was in federal custody, the State does not address
that matter.
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not fundamental, constitutional, or jurisdictional in nature." State v. Brocksmith, 888
P.2d 703,705 (Utah App. 1994) (quotation and citation omitted); State v. Penman, 964
P.2d 1157,1164 (Utah App. 1998) (same). Moreover, as explained, defendant has
demonstrated no violation of the IAD.
Defendant's claim that he was improperly brought to court and improperly
shuttled between state and federal custody therefore fails. He cannot show that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction or that it should have dismissed the charges with
prejudice.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS
MOTION TO SUPPRESS; ANY INITIAL SEARCH WAS
PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION AND
THE INDEPEDENDENT POST-ARREST SEARCH WAS
PERMISSIBLE AS A SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST AND AS
AN INVENTORY SEARCH
Defendant next claims that "the trial court erred when [it] denied [his] motion
to suppress evidence/' alleging that the police search of his vehicle was without
probable cause and without consent. Br. Appellant at 19 (boldface omitted). He
claims specifically that Officer Hansen had only reasonable suspicion to detain him,
but not probable cause, because Officer Hansen " [wa]s not sure whether the person
he detained had anything to do with the burglary/' Id. at 20.
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Facts relevant to motion to suppress?

Just before midnight on August 16/

2006, Officer Brad Hansen received a burglary call for an alarm that had been set off
at the Top Stop convenience store on Tenth North and Main in Logan. R349:14-15;
see also R244(PH):6. Officer Hansen traveled north on Main until he reached the
convenience store, arriving within a minute or two of the alarm call. R349:15,17.
He entered the store's parking lot on the south, drove his vehicle around the east
side, and then continued to the north parking lot, stopping about midway through
that lot. Id. As Officer Hansen drove up Main and into the parking lot, he did not
see anyone jogging. R349:15, 43.
As he parked his car, Officer Hansen noticed defendant running from the
northwest corner of the building toward his police vehicle. R349:15-16. Defendant
was wearing sweat pants and "sweating profusely/' R349:16. Officer Hansen asked
defendant what he doing, and defendant said that he was "out for a jog." Id.
3

The trial court judge, who had presided at the preliminary hearing a month
before the hearing on the motion to suppress, asked the parties to focus on when the
officers entered defendant's truck. R349:13. He suggested that the parties not dwell
on "the other facts leading up to that point." See R349:14. The State therefore
supplements the facts presented at the suppression hearing with facts presented at
the preliminary hearing, where useful for context.
The transcript of the preliminary hearing is contained in Packet A of the
record. Packet A also contains two other transcripts. The packet has been assigned
record number 244 (R244). To distinguish the transcript of the preliminary hearing
from the other two transcripts, the State refers to it as R244(PH).
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Defendant said "that he was a truck driver and that he jog[ged] in between the
routes to keep in shape/' Id. Officer Hansen told defendant why he was there and
asked defendant whether he had seen anything. R244(PH):7; R349:16. Defendant
said he had not. Id. Because of "the number of alarms [police receive] that are
false/7 Officer Hansen let defendant go and defendant ran east. Id.
Officer Hansen then continued his investigation at the Top Stop. As he drew
closer to the building, he saw a crow bar, a large axe/sledge hammer, a hat, and a
pair of gloves. R349:16-17. He noted that the lock to the door had been removed.
R349:17. Damage to an ATM machine was visible through a window. R349:24.4
Having seen evidence that a burglary had actually occurred, Officer Hansen
began looking for defendant. R349:17. Defendant was the only person he had seen
in the area when he arrived there within two minutes of receiving the alarm call,
and defendant had approached him from the exact area where the door lock had
been removed and the tools abandoned. R349:17-18.

4

It is not clear whether Officer Hansen saw the damaged ATM when he first
saw the burglary tools and gloves or whether he saw it during a later investigation
of the building. See R349:24.
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Officer Hansen turned east and saw "a large semi truck, car hauler, parked in
the . . . car wash parking lot" just east of the Top Stop. R349:18. Defendant was in
the cab, the truck was running, and the dome light was on. R349:18,36.
As Officer Hansen approached, defendant "came out of the vehicle, around
the front of the truck, with his hands in the air," saying, "I didn't do it, I didn't do it,
I didn't do anything." R349:19. Officer Hansen then asked defendant to sit on the
ground. Id. Defendant "dropped his hands, but he continued to advance towards
[the officer]." Id. Officer Hansen then pulled out his Tazer and again ordered
defendant to sit on the ground. Id. This time defendant complied. Id.
Officer Hansen called for backup because "the situation was not a safe
situation at that point." R349:19. Backup Officer Ostermiller arrived and "started
to deal with [defendant], talking with him, getting his name, information, so that we
could verify who we had, who we were talking with at that point." R349:20. Officer
Ostermiller ran inquiries that shortly returned information defendant "had a
warrant for his arrest out of Salt Lake." R349:22.
After Officer Ostermiller began getting defendant's information, Officer
Robert Olsen arrived. R349:20.
The initial inspection. Officers Hansen and Olsen then returned to the Top
Spot to further investigate the crime scene. Id. After "walk[ing] around the
sidewalk area of Tenth North looking for the lock" that had been popped off, Officer
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Hansen walked over to the car wash parking lot to check out the semi-truck/car
hauler. Id. He stepped up onto the driver's door area and found the driver's
window was down. Id. He looked in and saw "miscellaneous tools in the passenger
cab area of the truck," including a gas-powered chop saw. R349:20-22.
While checking out the truck, Officer Hansen used a flashlight to illuminate
the inside. R349:28. At some point, apparently as he focused the light on the floor
and illuminated a glove, his hand holding the flashlight went through the open
window. R349:28-29. Officer Hansen did not poke his head in, did not open the
truck door, and did not touch anything in the truck. R349:22, 29-30. But, as he
looked down onto the floor, he saw a blue glove similar to the gloves by the Top
Spot. R349:29.
When he got down, he informed defendant that "he was being detained for a
possible burglary." R349:22. "At that point Officer Ostermiller also informed
[Officer Hansen] that [defendant] had a warrant for his arrest out of Salt Lake." Id.
The officers arrested defendant and transported him to the police department.
R349:22-23.
The post-arrest search. The truck was still running. R349:36. Because no one
was there to pick it up, the officers performed a "safe keep" inventory to protect the
vehicle before impounding it. R349:36-37. During the inventory the officers found
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burglary tools, a computer identified as a computer taken from a Papa Murphy's
burglary, and other evidence of criminal activity. R349:37-40.
Proceedings below. On October 17, 2006, defendant filed a motion to
suppress evidence found in the truck and a supporting memorandum, and the
trial court conducted a hearing on the motion. R94, 95-98,144-46; 349:7. The
State called witnesses who testified to events that occurred on the night of the
offense. RR349:7-49.
After receiving this testimony, the trial court denied the motion to
suppress. R349:49. The trial court ruled that defendant was properly detained.
R349:48. The court stated that Officer Hansen's looking through the cab window
was not"necessarily inappropriate/' but that"irrespective of whether the glove
was seen or not seen by Officer Hansen, the defendant was . . . already legally in
custody" and that "once the existence of the warrant was discovered anything
thereafter was a search incident to an arrest, sufficient for an inventory purpose
and consistent with further investigation of the burglary of the service station."
R349:49.
The trial court reconfirmed this ruling on the first day of trial. See R350:8889. The court stated, "I found that the detention of the defendant on a temporary
basis was justified given all of the circumstances. And that there were articulable
reasons to suspect that the defendant [may have been] involved in criminal
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activities sufficient to detain him long enough to conduct the investigation,
which resulted in the discovery of a warrant for his arrest and therefore he was
arrested/ 7 R350:88. The trial court continued, "The search of the vehicle thereto
was consistent with the fact that it was there remaining and was running and
apparently belonged to the defendant and had to be seized and inventoried and
protected/ 7 Id.
Legal grounds apparent in the record. Officer Hansen's initial inspection
of the truck, if a search, was a lawful search under the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement. 5 The post-arrest search was lawful as a search incident
to defendant's arrest on an outstanding warrant, and, as the trial court ruled, as
an inventory search of an impounded vehicle.
A. This Court should decline review of defendant's claim because
it is inadequately briefed.
Defendant's claim is inadequately briefed, and this Court should decline to
review it.
Adequate briefing. Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires
an appellant's brief to set forth an argument that "contain[s] the contentions and
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds
5

This Court may affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress on
any basis apparent in the record. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ^f 10,52 P.3d 1158.
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for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on/' It is not enough under this
rule to superficially cite to authority; rather, the rule requires a " substantive
examination" of the contention presented. State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, ^ 11-13,974
P.2d 269. "A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with
pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing
party may dump the burden of argument and research." Id. at f 11 (quotation and
citations omitted). Accord State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 6,1 P.3d 1108. Cf. United
States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955,956 (7th Or. 1991) ("Judges are not like pigs, hunting
for truffles buried in their briefs"). "Briefs that do not comply with rule 24 'may be
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court/" Gamblin, 2000 UT
44, If 8 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 24(k)).
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress evidence discovered in a search of his semi-truck. Br. Appellant at 19.
Defendant notes that the "automobile exception" permits the warrantless search of a
mobile vehicle where probable cause exists to believe that it contains evidence of a
crime. See id. He concedes that his truck was mobile. See id. He contends, however,
that probable cause was lacking to search the vehicle. He does not address any of
the evidence suggesting that the truck might contain evidence but merely asserts
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that the "officer admitted] that he [wa]s not sure whether the person he detained
had anything to do with the burglary/ 7 Id. at 20.
Defendant cites no authority for his implicit claim that probable cause
requires the certainty, not the probability, that evidence will be found. Nor does he
set forth the record evidence to which the officer testified and upon whicl^ the
officer determined that evidence would likely be found in the truck.
Thus, defendant has dumped the burden of research on the court, leaving the
court to research both the record and the law and to analyze the record facts in light
of the law. His claim is inadequately briefed, and this Court should decline to
review it.
B. Assuming a search occurred, the search was lawful under the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
In any event, assuming that Officer Hansen inspection of defendant's semitruck cab through its open window was a search, the search was lawful under the
automobile exception.
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1. No Fourth Amendment search occurred.
As a preliminary matter, the State does not concede that any search occurred.
In some situations, an officer may discover evidence in "a situation in which there
has been no Fourth Amendment search at all/' LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.2(a) at
448 (4th ed. 2004). This may occur where "an observation is made by a police officer
without a prior physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area/' Id.
In this case, Officer Hansen looked through the open window of defendant's
semi-truck, which was idling in the car wash parking lot where defendant had
parked it. R349:20-22,36. The chop saw and miscellaneous tools were visible from
the window. R349:20-22. Officer Hansen also saw a blue glove in the floor area of
the cab similar to the gloves by the Top Spot door. Id.
Officer Hansen admitted that his hand passed through the plane of the open
window when he used his flashlight to look down onto the floor where he saw the
glove. R349:29. At that point, however, Officer Hansen had already seen the
burglary tools in the truck's cab. R349:22, 24. Even assuming a search occurred
when Officer Hansen's hand entered the open window, Officer Hansen had
discovered the tools before that search, and evidence of the tools was not fruit of
that search. Rather, discovery of the tools in the cab only increased the evidence
supporting probable cause to believe that evidence of a burglary would be found in
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the cab. As explained below, once Officer Hansen had probable cause, any search
was permissible under the automobile exception. 6
2. If a search occurred, it was permissible under the
automobile exception.
Automobile

exception. In most cases, police must seek a warrant before

conducting a search. See Maiyland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (citing
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,390-91 (1985)). If, however, "a car is readily
mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth
A m e n d m e n t . . . permits police to search the vehicle without more." Pennsylvania
v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996). Under "established precedent, the
'automobile exception' has no separate exigency requirement/' Dyson, 527 U.S.
at 466. This exception is based first "on the automobile's 'ready mobility' and
second on "the individual's reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile,
owing to its pervasive regulation." Labron, 518 U.S. at 940.

6

Moreover, it appears that the only piece of evidence that Officer Hansen
found after his hand passed through the window was the glove. R349:29. As the
trial court observed, "[t]he discovery of the glove" was only "tangentially related"
to the other evidence Officer Hansen saw looking through the window. R350:88.
Failure to suppress evidence of the glove was, if anything, harmless error. See
LaFave, Search & Seizure § 11.7(f) at 479 & n.264 (4th ed. 2004 & Supp. 2008-2009)
and cases cited therein.
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Probable cause. "[P]robable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard" and
"merely requires that the facts available to the officer would 'warrant a m a n of
reasonable caution in the belief,'... that certain items may be contraband or stolen
property or useful as evidence of a crime[.]" Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,742 (1983)
(quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,162 (1925)). "[I]t does not demand any
showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false." Id. It requires
simply "a reasonable ground for belief," Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366,371 (2003),
not "a probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity," Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983). In other words, "[t]he process" of calculating
probable cause "does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities." Brown,
460 U.S. at 742.
"The determination of whether probable cause exists" for a warrantless search
of a vehicle "depends upon an examination of all the information available to the
searching officer in light of the circumstances as they existed at the time the search
was made." State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085,1088 (Utah 1986) (citing Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)); see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149
(1925) (probable cause is "a belief, reasonably arising out of the circumstances
known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which
by law is subject to seizure and destruction").

"[A] police officer may draw

inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists,"
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Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996), including inferences "that might
well elude an untrained person/ 7 United States v. Cortex, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
Analysis.

Here, defendant concedes that Officer Hansen had reasonable

suspicion to detain defendant, see Br. Appellant at 20, and that the semi-truck was
mobile, See id. at 19. Defendant argues, however, that Officer Hansen lacked
probable cause to believe that defendant's semi-truck would contain evidence of the
Top Stop burglary.
Defendant's claim fails. An examination of all of the information known to
Officer Hansen when he first looked through the truck's window demonstrates that
he had probable cause to believe that the truck might contain evidence of the Top
Spot burglary. First, only two minutes before he arrived on the scene, Officer
Hansen had received an alarm call informing him that a burglary alarm had
sounded at the business. R349:14-17. Second, he had seen evidence of a burglary at
the Top Spot's northwest door. Outside that door, he saw burglary tools — a crow
bar and a large axe/sledge hammer.

R349:16-17. Moreover, he saw that the

someone had popped out the door's lock. Id. These facts would warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that a burglary had occurred.
Further, Officer Hansen had probable cause to believe not only that a burglary
had occurred, but also that defendant had been involved in the incident. Driving to
the scene just before midnight, Officer Hansen had seen only one person anywhere
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in the vicinity of the Top Spot. Id. That person, defendant, had come running
toward Officer Hansen's car as Officer Hansen pulled into the Top Spot's north
parking lot. Id. Defendant was running from the northwest corner of the Top Spot
building, the place where Officer Hansen, prior to the search, found the burglary
tools and the door with its lock popped out. R349:16-18. Defendant was sweating
profusely, indicating that he had been engaged in some physically taxing activity.
R349:16. While he claimed that he had been jogging, Officer Hansen had seen no
one jogging in the area as he approached the scene. R349:15. In addition, the tools
at the northwest door suggested that some physical exertion had been required to
force entry.
Officer Hansen, moreover, had probable cause to believe that the truck
contained evidence of the crime. After allowing defendant to go, Officer Hansen
had watched defendant run east. R349:16. When Officer Hansen then saw burglary
tools and the popped-out lock by the Top Spot door and realized that this had not
been a false alarm, he immediately looked for defendant.

R349:17. He saw

defendant sitting in a lighted semi-truck, parked and running in the car wash lot
that abutted the Top Spot parking lot on the east. R244(PH):8; R349:18. Officer
Hansen had probable cause to believe that defendant might have transported items
used in the burglary or something taken in the burglary to the semi-truck.
Defendant may have had additional burglary tools in the truck. He may have been
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in the process of moving items out of the Top Spot into the truck and may have
placed those items in the truck before Officer Hansen arrived on the scene. He may
have secreted items taken from the Top Spot on his person and may have been
carrying those items to the truck when Officer Hansen first spotted him. For all of
these reasons, Officer Hansen had probable cause to believe that the semi-truck
might contain evidence of defendant's involvement in the crime.
Further, as Officer Hansen approached the semi-truck, defendant jumped out
and walked toward him, protesting, "I didn't do it. I didn't do it." R349:19.
Defendant's unusual behavior suggested a consciousness of guilt. See Watson v.
State, 1999 WL 21470 (Tex. App.) (unpublished) (reproduced in Addendum I).
Finally, Officer Hansen had, as an additional basis for probable cause, the
information he acquired when he first looked through the open truck window and
saw the gas-powered chop saw and miscellaneous tools in the passenger cab area of
the truck. R349:21-22,24. Officer Hansen could see these items, visible through the
window, R349:24, before any search that may have begun when his hand entered
the truck window. R349:28-29.
In sum, because defendant was the only person near the Top Spot when
Officer Hansen arrived, because Officer Hansen saw defendant there within minutes
of the alarm, because defendant was coming from the area near the popped-lock
door, because defendant's sweating would have been consistent with physical
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exertion to break into the building, because defendant's behavior was so unusual,
and because Officer Hansen could see the chop-saw and various other tools when
he looked through the truck window, Officer Hansen had probable cause to believe
that defendant may have been involved in the burglary. The facts known to Officer
Hansen were sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that
defendant was the person who had burglarized the Top Spot and in the belief that
evidence of his involvement might be found within his semi-truck.
Defendant claims that Officer Hansen "[wa]s not sure whether the person he
detained had anything to do with the burglary" but "still entered t h e . . . truck/' Br.
Appellant at 20. That is beside the point. As explained, probable cause "does not
demand any showing that such [an officer's] belief be correct or more likely true
than false/ 7 Brown, 460 U.S. at 742. It sufficed that Officer Hansen's belief was
reasonable.
Because Officer Hansen had probable cause to believe that the truck contained
evidence of the burglary and because the truck was indisputably mobile, Officer
Hansen's initial inspection or search of the truck was lawful.
C

Evidence was lawfully obtained independently of any
information found in the initial search of the truck —first as a
search incident to arrest, and second, as an inventory search.

Even assuming that Officer Hansen's initial pre-arrest search oi defendant's
vehicle was unlawful, the challenged evidence was admissible under the
40

independent source doctrine. Independent of any information found in the initial
search, the officers arrested defendant on an outstanding warrant and lawfully
searched his truck (1) in a search incident to that arrest and (2) in a preimpoundment inventory search.
Independent source doctrine.

Even where evidence is initially discovered

during an unlawful search, the exclusionary rule does not prohibit the use of the
evidence discovered if the challenged evidence also has an independent source. The
independent source doctrine applies "to evidence obtained for the first time during
an independent lawful search" and also "to evidence initially discovered during, or
as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from
activities untainted by the initial illegality." Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533,
537 (1988).
The United States Supreme Court explained the doctrine as a matter of public
policy. "'[T]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the
public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are balanced
by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position than they would have been in
if no police error or misconduct had occurred

'" Murray, 487 U.S. at 537 (quoting

Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984) (emphasis in Nix).

The Court explained,

"'When the challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such
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evidence would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in
absent any error or violation/' Id. (citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 443).
1. Running a warrants check unconnected with the initial
search of the truck, Officer Ostermiller discovered an
outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest Police lawfully
arrested defendant on the basis of that warrant.
After Officer Hansen had detained defendant, he called for backup. R349:19.
Backup Officer Ostermiller arrived, took responsibility for obtaining defendant's
information, and ran a warrants check.

R349:20.

While Officer Ostermiller

remained with defendant and ran the warrants check, Officer Hansen returned to
the Top Spot and then began looking in the open window of defendant's truck.
R349:20-22.
Officer Ostermiller's decision to run the warrants check was not prompted by
anything that Officer Hansen saw during his initial search of the truck, but was part
of his effort to obtain information about defendant—the assignment he undertook
when the other officers left to further investigate the burglary.
When Officer Hansen again joined Officer Ostermiller, Officer Ostermiller
informed Officer Hansen that he had learned that defendant was wanted on an
outstanding warrant out of Salt Lake. R349:22. Defendant was lawfully arrested on
the basis of this outstanding warrant.
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2. Officers lawfully searched defendant's truck in a search
incident to defendant's arrest on an outstanding warrant.
Evidence found in that search had a source independent of
anything found in the initial search of the truck.
Search incident to arrest. When a defendant is lawfully arrested, police may
conduct a search incident to arrest. They need not have probable cause to believe
that they will find arms or discover evidence. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,461
(1981). "'A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search
incident to the arrest requires no additional justification/" Id. (quoting United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)). "[W]hen a policeman has made a lawful
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous
incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile" and
"also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger
compartment." Id. at 460 (citation omitted). Moreover, a vehicle search incident to
arrest is lawful even in circumstances where an arrestee has "exited his car before
the officer initiated contact," that is, whether the arrestee is an "occupant" or a
"recent occupant" of the car, as was the case here. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S.
615, 621-22 (2004).
Having arrested defendant in this case, officers were entitled to search the cab
of the truck incident to that arrest. And it was during that search that the officers
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seized the burglary evidence inside the cab. The evidence the officers found in the
search incident to arrest therefore had a source independent of evidence discovered
during any initial truck search. That evidence, the product of the outstanding
warrant, was admissible under the "independent source" doctrine.
3. Alternatively, officers conducted a lawful inventory search
of the truck following defendant's arrest on his
outstanding warrant. Evidence found in the inventory
search had a source independent of anything found in the
initial search of the truck.
Inventoiy searches. Alternatively, where police legally arrest a defendant
who is driving a car, they may inventory the car prior to impounding it.
"[I]nventory searches are now a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement
of the Fourth Amendment/7 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987). "The
policies behind the warrant requirement are not implicated in an inventory search,
nor is the related concept of probable cause/' Id. (citation omitted). Rather,
"inventory procedures serve to protect an owner's property while it is in the
custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property,
and to guard the police from danger." Id. at 372. The United States Supreme Court
"has consistently sustained police intrusions into automobiles impounded or
otherwise in lawful police custody where the process is aimed at securing or
protecting the car and its contents." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373
(1976).
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Here, after arresting defendant on his outstanding warrant, police inventoried
the truck he had been driving.

Officer Scott Bodily testified that at the time

defendant was arrested pursuant to the warrant, his truck was still running.
R349:36. "[N]o one was there to pick it up so the truck needed to be safe[-]keep[-]
inventoried to protect the vehicle itself/' Id. "[A]t the very least an inventory of the
contents of the vehicle needed to be done prior to that impound/' R349:36-37.
During the inventory, the officers discovered evidence of defendant's involvement
in the burglary and in other crimes. See R349:37-38 (noting chop saw, bolt cutter,
computer taken from a Papa Murphy's burglary, etc.).
Again, defendant claims that the initial pre-arrest truck inspection was
unlawful and that "[a]U items found in the truck should have been excluded from
evidence." Br. Appellant at 21. Assuming arguendo that evidence in the truck "was
initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search," that
evidence was "later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial
illegality." Murray, 487 U.S. at 537. Because the inventory search was conducted
independently from any alleged illegality, the evidence found in the inventory
search was admissible.
CONCLUSION
This Court should dismiss defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. If the
Court finds that it has jurisdiction, it should affirm defendant's conviction because
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defendant has not shown that the State violated the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers or that the trial court erred in refusing to exclude the evidence found in
the truck.
Respectfully submitted February £S, 2009.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General
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Addenda

Addendum A

U.S. Const, amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.

Utah Code Section 77-29-5

UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE

Page 1 of4
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77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers -- Enactment into law - Text of agreement.
The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby enacted into law and entered into by this state
with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows:
The contracting states solemnly agree that:
ARTICLE I
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried
indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already
incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner
treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this
agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of
the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints.
The party states also find that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when
emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of co-operative
procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide such co-operative procedures.
ARTICLE II
As used in this agreement:
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States of America; a territory or
possession of the United States; District of Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time that he
initiates a request for final dispositions pursuant to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for
custody or availability is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof.
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had on an indictment, information
or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article IV hereof.
ARTICLE III
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional
institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is
pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which
a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within 180 days after he
shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the
prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a
final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good cause
shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the
matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be
accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term
of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to
be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the
prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall be
given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having
custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate
prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the prisoner shall
promptly inform him of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also
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inform him of his right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information or
complaint on which the detainer is based.
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall
operate as a request for final disposition of all untried indictments, informations or complaints on the
basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting
official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. The warden, commissioner of
corrections or other official having custody of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate
prosecuting officers and courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's
request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. Any
notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by copies of the prisoner's written
notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint
contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such
indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall
enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to a paragraph (a) hereof shall
also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated
thereby or included therein by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to the
receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after completion of his term of
imprisonment in the sending state. The request for final disposition shall also constitute a consent by
the prisoner to the production of his body in any court where his presence may be required in order to
effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to the
original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this
paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law.
(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the request for final
disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall void the request.
ARTICLE IV
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information or
complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and
who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with Article V
(a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or availability to the
appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated; provided that the court
having jurisdiction of such indictment, information or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded
and transmitted the request; and provided further that there shall be a period of 30 days after receipt
by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within which period the governor of the
sending state may disapprove the request for temporary custody or availability, either upon his own
motion or upon motion of the prisoner.
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, the
appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating
the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time
remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility
of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Said authorities
simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and appropriate courts in
the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with similar certificates and with
notices informing them of the request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor.
(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be commenced within one
hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in
open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may
grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.
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(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any prisoner of any right which he
may have to contest the legality of his delivery as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery
may not be opposed or denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not
affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery.
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the
prisoner's being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V (e) hereof, such
indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall
enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
ARTICLE V
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate authority in
a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in
the state where such indictment, information or complaint is pending against such person in order that
speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the request for final disposition is made by the
prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of
this agreement. In the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving state shall
be entitled to temporary custody as provided by this agreement or to the prisoner's presence in
federal custody at the place for trial, whichever custodial arrangement may be approved by the
custodian.
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of temporary custody shall
present the following upon demand:
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the state into whose temporary
custody the prisoner is to be given.
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the
detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner
has been made.
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of said person, or in
the event that an action on the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer
has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV hereof, the
appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has been pending
shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease
to be of any force or effect.
(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for the purpose of permitting
prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or more untried indictments, informations or
complaints which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or
charges arising out of the same transaction. Except for his attendance at court and while being
transported to or from any place at which his presence may be required, the prisoner shall be held in
a suitable jail or other facility regularly used for persons awaiting prosecution.
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the
prisoner shall be returned to the sending state.
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner is otherwise being made
available for trial as required by this agreement, time being served on the sentence shall continue to
run but good time shall be earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice
of the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow.
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as provided in this agreement is
exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of
the sending state and any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as
an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner permitted by law.
(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until
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such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody of the sending state, the state in which the one
or more untried indictments, informations or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had shall
be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping and
returning the prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall govern unless the states concerned
shall have entered into a supplementary agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and
responsibilities as between or among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to
alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies and officers of and in the
government of a party state, or between a party state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs,
or responsibilities therefor.
ARTICLE VI
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods provided in Articles III and
IV of this agreement, the running of said time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the
prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter.
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by this agreement, shall apply
to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.
ARTICLE VII
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting jointly with like officers of
other party states, shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and
provisions of this agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information
necessary to the effective operation of this agreement.
ARTICLE VIII
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when such state has
enacted the same into law. A state party to this agreement may withdraw herefrom enacting a statute
repealing the same. However, the withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any
proceedings already initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time such withdrawal takes effect,
nor shall it affect their rights in respect thereof.
ARTICLE IX
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. The provisions of this
agreement shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this agreement is
declared to be contrary to the Constitution of any party state or of the United States or the
applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of
the remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or
circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this agreement shall be held
contrary to the Constitution of any state party hereto, the agreement shall remain in full force and
effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable
matters.
Enacted by Chapter 15, 1980 General Session
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Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate
court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the
clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from. However, when a judgment or order
is entered in a statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the
trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or
order appealed from.

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 30. Errors and defects.
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record
and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the
court may order.

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in
an illegal manner, at any time.

Addendum B

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JURY VERDICT

-vs-

COUNTS 1-10

KENDALL SWENSON,

Case No. 061100748

Defendant.

We the jurors duly impaneled find the Defendant, KENDALL ROSELL SWENSON:
COUNT/1:
Not Guilty\)f Possession of a controlled substance, to wit: ^Cocaine, a Third Degree
Felony.
Guilty of Possession of a controlled substance, to wit: Cocaine, Third Degree Felony.

COUNT 2:
ot Guilty of Burglary, a Third Degree Felony.
Guilty of Burglary, a Third Degree Felony.

COUNT 3:
/ Not Guilty of Burglary, a Third Degree Felony.
V

Guilty of Burglary, a Third Degree Felony.

COUNT 4:
Not guilty of Criminal Mischief, a third degree felony.
Guilty of Criminal Mischief, a third degree felony.

COUNT 5:
Not guilty of Criminal Mischief, a class A misdemeanor.
Guilty of Criminal Mischief, a class A misdemeanor.

COUNT 6:
Not guilty of Possession of Paraphernalia, within 1000 feet of a school, a class A

misdemeanor. (^yUliMJl'

t<0 MTPuLo^A

HAAuCu^A^\4t

Hj

Guilty of Possession of Paraphernalia, within ICwOTeet of a school, a class A
misdemeanor.

COUNT 7:
Not guilty of Theft, a third degree felony.
Guilty of Theft, a third degree felony.

COUNT 8:
Jot guilty of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a class B misdemeanor.
Guilty of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a class B misdemeanor.

COUNT 9:
Not guilty of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree felony

•* 70

Guilty of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree felony

COUNT 10:
Not guilty of Unlawful Possession of Burglary Tools, a class B misdemeanor
Guilty of Unlawful Possession of Burglary Tools, a class B misdemeanor

Dated: flfj^
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Addendum C

FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 061100748 FS

KENDALL ROSELL SWENSON,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

GORDON J LOW
March 5, 2007

PRESENT
Clerk:
tracih
Prosecutor: SWINK, JAMIE M
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): PERRY, DAVID M
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: March 28, 1963
Video
Tape Count: 4:04
CHARGES
2. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty
3. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty
3rd Degree Felony
4. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - INTENTIONAL DAMAGE
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty
Class A Misdemeanor
5. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - INTENTIONAL DAMAGE
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty
7. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty
3rd Degree Felony
<8. THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty
3rd Degree Felony
9. THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty
10. MANUFACTURE/POSSESS BURGLARY TOOLS - Class B Misdemeanor
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty
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Case No: 061100748
Date:
Mar 05, 2007
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF INTENTIONAL DAMAGE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced
to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN
PROPERTY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN
PROPERTY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
To the CACHE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Court orders felony and misdemeanor charges to run concurrent at
Utah State Prison. Court reccommends credit for time served.

Page 2

Case No: 061100748
Date:
Mar 05, 2007
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
Court orders restitution in the amount of $5,210.00,

SENTENCE JAIL

Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF INTENTIONAL DAMAGE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 365 day(s)

Based on the defendant's conviction of MANUFACTURE/POSSESS BURGLARY
TOOLS a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term
of 180 day(s)
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 2

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$5000.00
$0.00
$4275.00
$9275.00

Charge # 3

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$5000.00
$0.00
$4275.00
$9275.00

Charge # 4

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$5000.00
$0.00
$4275.00
$9275.00

Charge # 5

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge

$2500.00
$0.00
$2150.00
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Case No: 061100748
Date:
Mar 05, 2007
Due: $4650.00
Charge # 7

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$5000.00
$0.00
$4275.00
$9275.00

Charge # 8

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$5000.00
$0.00
$42 75.0 0
$9275.00

Charge # 9

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$5000.00
$0.00
$4275.00
$9275.00

Charge # 10

Fine: $1000.00
Suspended: $0.00
Surcharge: $875.00
Due: $1875.00

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$33500.00
$0
$28675.00
$62175.00
Plus Interest

Pay fine to The Court.

Dated t h i s iM

day of M(X H f f t ^
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Addendum D

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
vs.

ADDENDUM TO SENTENCE,
JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
Case No: 061100748 FS
Judge Low

KENDALL SWENSON
Defendant

This matter is before the Court upon a Motion filed by the defense to amend
the original Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment on the above referenced case.
In response, this Court has addressed the motion with both counsel on
previous occasions and on this the 27th day of July, 2007. In an effort to expedite
the matter the Court issues the following Order and where applicable a
recommendation to the Federal Board of Pardons and any other parties associated
with this case.
Subsequent to a jury trial conviction, on March 5,2007 this Court sentenced
the above referenced defendant. Burglary Felony 3rd, two counts, 0-5 years each.
Criminal Mischief Felony 3rd, 0-5 years. Theft By Receiving Stolen Property
Felony 3rd, two counts, 0-5 years each. Manufacturing/Possession Burglary Tools
class B Misdemeanor, 180 days.
The Court ordered all counts to run concurrent and to be served at the Utah
State Prison and recommended credit for time served.
The Defendant has a pending Federal case, or is on Federal Parole any
details of which this Court is uninformed.

A

)\°
A

3V+ o

This Court had at the time of sentencing expressed the intention that this
sentence is to run concurrent with any Federal court. This Order is in clarification
that the state's case is not to run consecutive to any proceedings by the Federal
authorities and that this sentence can be served concurrent at any applicable
Federal institution or the Utah State Prison.

Dated this^SH^Y

of July, 2007

BY THE

IT

'

*&l COURT ^tg.

J</S

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 0S1100748 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

By Hand
By Hand
Dated this 3D

NAME
BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLE
Third Pty Plaintiff
448 E 6400 S. SUITE 300
MURRAY, UT 84107
DAVID M PERRY
JAMIE M SWINK

day of y \\XXUL^
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Addendum E

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

State of Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20070346-CA
F I L E D
(November 1, 2 0 07)

Kendall R. Swenson,
2 0 0 7 UT A p p

359

Defendant and Appellant.

First District, Logan Department, 061100748
The Honorable Gordon J. Low
Attorneys:

David M. Perry, Logan, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Thorne.
PER CURIAM:
Kendall R. Swenson appeals from his convictions after a jury
trial. This is before the court on its own motion for summary
disposition based on lack of jurisdiction.
Under rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a
notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after the entry
of the order appealed from. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). In a
criminal case, it is the sentence that constitutes the final
judgment from which to appeal. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100,
f 4, 57 P.3d 1065. The " '[thirty]-day period for filing [a]
notice of appeal in a criminal case . . . is jurisdictional and
cannot be enlarged by this [c]ourt.'" Id. H 5 (alterations in
original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37 (Utah
1984)) .
Swenson was sentenced at a sentencing hearing on March 5,
2 007. The trial court formally entered Swenson ! s sentence in the
record on March 14, 2007. Swenson filed his notice of appeal on
April 20, 2007, thirty-seven days after the entry of his sentence
and outside of the time to appeal. As a result, this court lacks
jurisdiction over the appeal. See id.

Swenson argues, however, that an addendum to the sentence
entered on July
30, 2 007, re-started his time to appeal. The
rule governing amended judgments in Utah is well-settled:
" [W]here a belated entry merely constitutes
an amendment or modification not changing the
substance or character of the judgment, such
entry is merely a nunc pro tunc entry which
relates back to the time the original
judgment was entered, and does not enlarge
the time for appeal; but where the
modification or amendment is in some material
matter, the time begins to run from the time
of the modification or amendment."
State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, f 11, 106 P.3d 729 (quoting Adamson
v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264, 268 (1947)).
Here, the addendum to the sentence did not constitute a
material change. The addendum clarified that Swenson's state
sentences were to run concurrently with any federal case ongoing.
The clarification does not change the substance or character of
the judgment, particularly since the failure to specify that the
sentences were concurrent in the sentencing order was a mere
oversight. As a clarification rather than a material change, the
addendum is not sufficient to enlarge the time to appeal.
Accordingly, Swenson's notice of appeal was untimely filed and
this court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal.
Dismissed.

Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge

James Z. Davis, Judge

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

20070346-CA
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Addendum F

FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 061100748 FS

KENDALL ROSELL SWENSON,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

GORDON J LOW
March 5, 2007

PRESENT
Clerk:
tracih
Prosecutor: SWINK, JAMIE M
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): PERRY, DAVID M
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: March 28, 1963
Video
Tape Count: 4:04
CHARGES
2. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty
3. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty
4. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - INTENTIONAL DAMAGE
3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty
5. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - INTENTIONAL DAMAGE
Class A Misdemeanor
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty
7. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty
8. THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY - Class B Misdemeanor
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty
9. THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty
10. MANUFACTURE/POSSESS BURGLARY TOOLS - Class B Misdemeanor
- Disposition: 10/19/2006 Guilty
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fifo

37^/A

Case No: 061100748
Date:
Mar 05, 2007
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF INTENTIONAL DAMAGE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced
to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN
PROPERTY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
To the CACHE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Court orders felony and misdemeanor charges to run concurrent at
Utah State Prison. Court reccommends credit for time served.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
Court orders restitution in the amount of $5,210.00. Court
recommends that this sentence runs concurrent with federal
sentence.

Page 2

Case No: 061100748
Date:
Mar 05, 2007

SENTENCE JAIL

Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF INTENTIONAL DAMAGE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 3 65 day(s)
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN
PROPERTY a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a
term of 180 day(s)
Based on the defendant's conviction of MANUFACTURE/POSSESS BURGLARY
TOOLS a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term
of 180 day(s)
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 2

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$5000.00
$0.00
$4275.00
$9275.00

Charge # 3

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$5000.00
$0.00
$4275.00
$9275.00

Charge # 4

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$5000.00
$0.00
$4275.00
$9275.00

Charge # 5

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$2500.00
$0.00
$2150.00
$4650.00

Page 3
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Case No: 061100748
Date:
Mar 05, 2007
Charge # 7

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$5000.00
$0.00
$4275.00
$9275.00

Charge # 8

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$1000.00
$0.00
$875.00
$1875.00

Charge # 9

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$5000.0 0
$0.00
$4275.00
$9275.00

Charge # 10

Fine: $1000.00
Suspended: $0.00
Surcharge: $875.00
Due: $1875.00

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$29500
$0
$25275
$54775
Plus Interest

Pay fine to The Court.
Dated this / 2

day of

hdonAJX/^

ORDON J LOW

/TifitdBkui/^aA^on

D i s t r i c t Cburt Judg^
\

V^

^
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Addendum G
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Page 1

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 2092286 (M.D.Fla/
(Cite as: 2006 WL 2092286 (M.D.Fla.))

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Florida,
Tampa Division.
Steve BOWIE-MYLES,
v.
UNITED STATES of America.
Nos. 8.03-CR-437-T-17MAP, 8:06-CV-1161-T17MAP.
July 26, 2006.
Steve Bowie-Myles, Petersburg, VA, pro se.
Arthur Lee Bentley, III, U.S. Attorney's Office,
Tampa, FL, for United States of America.
ORDER
ELIZABETH A. KOVACHEVICR District Judge.
*1 This cause is before the Court upon Defendant's
motion to vacate, set aside, or correct an allegedly
illegal sentence pursuant to 28 U .S.C. § 2255 (Doc.
cv-l;cr-158).

BACKGROUND
On October 23, 2003, a grand jury in the Middle District of Florida returned a two count indictment
charging Defendant Bowie-Myles with: (a) possessing with intent to distribute five (5) kilograms or
more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 46 App.
U.S.C. S§ 1903(a) and 1903(g); 21 U.S.C. §
960(b)(l)(B)(ii); and 18 U.S.C. §2 (Count One); and
(b) conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five
(5) kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, a Schedule II
controlled substance, while on board a vessel subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of

46 App. U.S.C. gg 1903(a). 1 of 112 1903(i). and
1903(g); and 21 U.S.C. g 960(b)(l)(B)(ii) (Count
Two).1*1
FN1. The Indictment was sealed for reasons
unrelated to the charges against BowieMyles. A First superseding Indictment was
returned on November 6, 2003. D-cr-27. As
it relates to Defendant Bowie-Myles, the
First Superseding Indictment was identical
to the original Indictment. However, Defendant Bowie-Myles entered a plea of guilty
to-and was convicted on the charge contained in-Count One of the original Indictment (rather than to Count One of the First
Superseding Indictment). D-cr-50; D-cr-54;
D-cr-74; D-cr-82; D-cr-86; D-cr-148. At the
time of sentencing, the First Superseding Indictment was dismissed pursuant to a motion
by the Government. D-cr-82; D-cr-86.
Therefore, the First Superseding Indictment
will not be discussed further herein.
On January 7, 2004, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, D-cr-50, Defendant Bowie-Myles entered
a plea of guilty to Count One of the Indictment. D-cr54. The written plea agreement and the Rule 11 plea
colloquy clearly established that Defendant BowieMyles was pleading guilty to possessing with intent
to distribute five (5) kilograms or more of a mixture
or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, while on
board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, in violation of 46 App. U.S.C. g§ 1903(a) and
1903(g); and 21 U.S.C. g 960(b)(1)(B)(ii). D-cr-50;
D-cr-54.
On May 14, 2004, the Court sentenced Defendant
Bowie-Myles for his conviction on the charge contained in Count One of the Indictment. D-cr-82. Defendant Bowie-Myles was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of 168 months, a term of supervised
release of five (5) years, and a special assessment of
$100. D-cr-82; D-cr-86.

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 2092286 (M.D.Fla.)
(Cite as: 2006 WL 2092286 (M.D.Fla.))

On May 17, 2004, the criminal judgment was filed.
D-cr-86. The criminal judgment correctly stated Defendant Bowie's sentence. The criminal judgment
also correctly stated that Defendant Bowie Myles was
convicted of Count One of the Indictment, and correctly cited the operative provisions of the United
States Code, The criminal judgment also contained a
citation to 46 App. U.S.C. g 1903(0. This additional
citation was incorrect, but it was merely surplusage. 3
"46:USC:1903(a)(g)." However, in setting forth the
nature of the offense, the criminal judgment incorrectly stated that Defendant Bowie-Myles was convicted of "Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute 5 Kilograms or More of Cocaine."D-cr-86.
On May 27, 2004, Defendant Bowie-Myles filed a
timely notice of appeal. D-cr-91. Defendant's appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ("Eleventh Circuit") was assigned case
number 04-12743-D.
*2 On August 25, 2004, the Eleventh Circuit entered
a per curiam order dismissing the appeal with prejudice. D-cr-118. The order of dismissal was issued as
the mandate of the Eleventh Circuit. D-cr-118. Defendant Bowie-Myles did not file a petition for writ
of certiorari seeking review in the Supreme Court. Dcv-1 at 2.
On June 20, 2005, the Court, acting sua sponte, entered a First Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case,
D-cr-148, which corrected the clerical (or scrivener's)
error contained in the initial criminal judgment. See
Paragraph 4, above. The First Amended Judgment
correctly described the nature of offense as "Possession with Intent to Distribute Five Kilograms or More
of Cocaine."D-cr-148. There was no change in the
sentence imposed.
On June 22, 2006, Defendant Bowie-Myles filed the
instant Section 2255 motion. D-cv-1. The Section
2255 motion was signed and dated by Defendant
Bowie-Myles on June 16, 2006. D-cv-1 at 17. On
June 27, 2006, the Court entered an order directing,
among other things that the Government file "an abbreviated response addressing the issue of whether
the motion to vacate is timely under the AEDPA."Dcv-2.
MOTION TO VACATE IS UNTIMELY

Page 2

Section 2255 provides that a motion to vacate, set
aside, or correct sentence must be filed within one
year of the time a judgment of conviction becomes
"final." See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 116(1). When a defendant appeals, but does not seek certiorari review in
the Supreme Court, his conviction becomes "final"
when the 90-day period for seeking certiorari review
expires. See Clay v United Slates, 537 U.S. 522, 525
(2003)("For purposes of starting the clock on §
2255's one-year limitation period, ... a judgment of
conviction becomes final when the time expires for
filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate
court's affirmation of the conviction."); see also
Close v. United States, 336 F.3d 1283, 1285 (11th
Cir.2003) (same); Kaufman v. United States, 282
F.3d 1336, 1339 (11 th Cir.2002)fetme).
The Supreme Court's Rules make clear that the 90day period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari
runs from the time that a judgment is entered by the
Court of Appeals. S.Ct. R. 13(3). As explained
above, in this case, the Eleventh Circuit entered its
judgment dismissing Defendant Bowie-Myles' appeal
on August 25, 2004. The time for filing a petition for
a writ of certiorari expired 90 days later, on November 23, 2004. This is the date on which Defendant's
judgment became "final," within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 2255 11 6(1), and the one-year limitation
period began to run. Therefore, Defendant's Section
2255 motion would be timely only if it were filed on
or before November 23, 2005, which is the date that
he signed it.
As explained above, Defendant Bowie-Myles filed
the instant Section 2255 motion with the Court on
June 22, 2006. However, the Eleventh Circuit has
held that a prisoner's pro se Section 2255 motion is
deemed "filed" on the date that it is delivered to
prison authorities for mailing. See Adams v. United
States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11th Cir.1999);
Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301
(11thCir.200n. The Eleventh Circuit has further has
held that absent evidence to the contrary, it is to be
assumed that a Section 2255 Defendant's motion was
delivered to prison authorities or the date that he
signed it. Washington, 243 F.3d at 1301.
*3 Defendant Bowie-Myles' Section 2255 motion is
deemed to have been "filed" on June 16, 2006, which
is the date that he signed it. As explained above, the

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d
slot Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 2092286 (M.D.Fla.)
(Cite as: 2006 WL 2092286 (M.D.Fla.))

one year limitation period expired on November 23,
2005. Therefore, Defendant Bowie-Myles' Section
2255 motion is almost seven months out of time.
The Entry of the Amended Judgment Did Not
Restart Section 2255's One-Year Limitation Period
The Court, acting sua sponte, entered an amended
judgment on June 20, 2005. The change in the judgment, however, was merely clerical in nature; it did
nothing more than correct a scrivener's error. As explained above, the Court amended the judgment by
changing the description of the offense of conviction.
The change in the judgment was insignificant and did
not affect-adversely or otherwise-any of Defendant
Bowie-Myles' substantial rights. As explained above,
the original judgment correctly stated that Defendant
Bowie-Myles had been convicted of Count One of
the Indictment, and the operative statutory provisions
were properly cited therein. Most importantly, the
sentence imposed by the Court was correctly set forth
in the original judgment. The brief (13-word) description of the offense of conviction, under the heading "NATURE OF OFFENSE," admittedly was
wrong. However, if the first two words of the description, "conspiracy to," had been omitted, the
original judgment would have been correct and an
amendment would not have been necessary.
The deletion of the words "conspiracy to" in the
amended judgment was a simple clerical change correcting a scrivener's error. Rule 36. Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, provides that "the court may at
any time correct a clerical error in a judgment... arising from oversight or omission.'The Eleventh Circuit
repeatedly has held that the correction of the offense
of conviction in a criminal judgment is clerical in
nature. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 190 F.3d
1247, 1253 (11th Cir.l999)("the judgment reflects
the incorrect offense, ... which we regard as simply a
clerical error"); United States v. De La RosaHernandez,
157
Fed.
Appx.
219
filth
Cir.2005)(unpublished)(fact that judgment incorrectly references count of conviction as possessioninstead of conspiracy to possess-is a "clerical error").
Indeed, in addressing a judgment that incorrectly
referenced a crime entirely unrelated to the offense of
conviction (and cited a statutory subsection that did
not exist), the Eleventh Circuit held:
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The judgment entered in this case indicates that [the
defendant] was convicted of "18 U.S.C. § 911(g)
Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon.'The
section reference is a scrivener's error.Section 9\ 1
involves the crime of falsely impersonating a federal
officer or employee, and that statutory provision has
no subsections. [The defendant] was actually indicted
for, pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, violating
18 U.S.C. g 922(g), which is the provision prohibiting the possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon.... The judgment should be amended accordingly....
*4 United States v. Wimbush, 103 F.3d 968, 970
(11th Cir.l997)(emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit further has held that when the district court corrects an error in a criminal judgment pursuant to Rule
36, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to
appeal the judgment does not begin anew. In United
States v. Portillo, 363 F.3d 1161(11th Cir.2004), the
district court corrected a clerical error in the restitution provision of a criminal judgment. Thereafter, the
defendant appealed the restitution portion of the
amended judgment.
The Eleventh Circuit held that the appeal was untimely, pursuant to Rule 4(b)(1)(A), Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, because the defendant should
have appealed the restitution order in the original
judgment (which he did not do). The correction of the
clerical error did not provide the defendant with a
second opportunity to appeal the judgment. Id. at
1166.
Although there does not appear to be an Eleventh
Circuit case squarely addressing whether the correction of a clerical error with an amended judgment
restarts the one-year limitation provision of Section
2255 ^1 6(1), the logic of Portillo clearly indicates that
it does not. After all, the Supreme Court has held that
a judgment of conviction becomes "final," for purposes of Section 2255, when the defendant's opportunity for direct appeal of his conviction has been exhausted. See Clay v. United States, 537 U .S. 522,
527-28 (2003).
Furthermore, the other courts that have addressed this
narrow issue appear to have held uniformly that when
a case is remanded for a ministerial reason or for the
correction of a clerical error (or when the district
court sua sponte corrects a clerical error in a judg-

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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ment), the one-year limitation period of Section 2255
does not begin anew when the district court corrects
performs the ministerial directive of the appellate
court or corrects the clerical error. See United States
v. Wilson, 256 F.3d 217. 219-20 (4th Cir.2001)(
Section 2255 limitation period not restarted when the
district court performs the ministerial task of vacating
one count on remand); United States v Dodson, 291
F.3d 268. 275 (4th Cir.2002)(Section 2255 limitation
period does not begin anew when "appellate court ...
remands for a ministerial purpose that could not result in a valid second appeal"); United States v.
Greer, 79 Appx. 974 (9th Cir.2003)(unpublished)(a
district court's sua sponte amendment of a judgment,
which did not make any change to the legally operative sentence, did not restart Section 2255's limitation
period); United States v. Haves, 2006 WL 851184
(E.D.La. March 13. 2006)("remand for ministerial
purposes does not toll the period for filing a habeas
petition because the defendant would have no legitimate grounds for direct appeal of the district court's"
amended judgment); see also Richardson v. Bram/ey,
998 F.2d 463. 465 (7th Cir.1993X4Ta1 judgment is
not final if the appellate court has remanded the case
to the lower court for further proceedings, unless the
remand is for a purely "ministerial" purpose")(emphasis added).
*5 In sum, the Court's sua sponte amendment to the
judgment, which did nothing more than correct a
clerical or scrivener's error, did not restart Section
2255's one-year limitation period. Therefore, as explained above, Defendant Bowie-Myles' conviction
became "final," for purposes of Section 2255. on
November 23, 2004, when the 90-day period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari expired. Pursuant
to Section 2255 <f| 6(1). Defendant Bowie-Myles had
until November 23, 2005, to file a Section 2255 motion. The instant motion, "filed" (under the Eleventh
Circuit's mailbox rule) on June 16, 2006, was almost
seven months out of time.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant is not
entitled to a certificate of appealability. A prisoner
seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court's denial of his petition. 28 U.S.C. g 2253(c)(1). Rather, a district court
must first issue a certificate of appealability
(COA).W."A [COA] may issue ... only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right/'W . at § 2253(c)(2). To make
such a showing, defendant "must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong," Tennardv. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004)
(quoting Slack v. McDaniel 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000)), or that "the issues presented were 'adequate
to deserve encouragement to proceed further,' "
Miller-El v, Cockrell 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003)
(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n. 4
(1983)). Defendant has not made the requisite showing in these circumstances.
Finally, because Defendant is not entitled to a certificate of appealability, he is not entitled to appeal in
forma pauperis.
ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on July 26, 2006.
M.D.Fla.,2006.
Bowie-Myles v. U.S.
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 2092286
(M.D.Fla.)
END OF DOCUMENT

Defendant has not demonstrated that extraordinary
circumstances entitle him to equitable tolling.
Accordingly, the Court orders:
That Defendant Bowie-Myles' motion to vacate (Doc.
cv-1; cr-158) is denied, with prejudice. The Clerk is
directed to enter judgment against Bowie-Myles in
the civil case and to close that case.
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Addendum H

U.S. Department of Justice
United States Marshals Service

DETAINER
BASED ON VIOLATION OF PROBATION AND/OR SUPERVISED RELEASE
UNITED STATES MARSHAL
DISTRICT OF

Please type or print

TO:

UTAH

neatly:

CACHE COUNTY JAIL
ATTN: BOOKING/DETAINERS
1225 W VALLEY VIEW, STE #100
LOGAN. UT 84321

DATE: SEPTEMLER / , 2C06
SUBJECT: SWENSON, KENDALL ROSSEL
AKA:
DOB/SSN:
USMS#:
CR#:

03/28/63
07002-081
2:03CR135?GC

Please accept this Detainer against the above-named subject who is currently in your custody. The United States
District Court for the
D'Stnct of
UTAH
has issued an arrest
warrant charging the subject with violation of the conditions of probation and/or supervised release.
Prior to the subject's release from your custody, please notify this office at once so that we may assume custody if
necessary. If the subject is transferred from your custody to another detention facility, we request that you forward
out Detainer to said facility at the time of transfer and ad\ise this office as soon as posSib:c.
The nonce and speedy trial requirements of (he Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act do NOT apply to this
Detainer, which is based on a Federal probation/supervised release violation warrantPlease acknowledge receipt of this Detainer, in addition, piease provide one copy of the Detainer to the subject
and icturn one ^>py of the Detainer to this office in the enclosed self-addressed envelope.

Very truly yours,
RANDALL D . ANDERSON
United Stater Marshal

BY: LAURA JOHNSON /
INVESTIGATIVE RESEARCH SPEC
(801)524-3404
( 8 0 J ) 5 2 4 - 5 1 3 4 FAX

nmmei
PRIOR EDITIONS ARF OBSOLETE AN'D >OTTOBE USED

Torm USM-16d
Esi 11/98

Addendum I

m

l&

«•

#

West law
Not Reported in S.W.2d
Not Reported in S.W.2d, 1999 WL 21470 (Tex.App.-Ho . (1 Dist.))
(Cite as: 1999 WL 21470 (Tex.App.-Hous. (1 Dist.)))

C

^^^
able.

Page 1

TESTIMONY
Only the Westlaw citation is currently avail-

NOTICE: NOT DESIGNATED FOR
PUBLICATION. UNDER TX R RAP RULE 47.7,
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS HAVE NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE BUT MAY BE CITED
WITH THE NOTATION "(not designated for publication)."
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).
Michael Lawrence WATSON, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 01-97-00526-CR.
Jan. 21, 1999.
On Appeal from the 177th District Court, Harris
County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 737004.
Panel consists of Chief Justice SCHNEIDER and
Justices NUCHIA and HOLLINGSWORTH.
OPINION
HOLLINGSWORTH. m
FN1. The Honorable Cynthia Hollingsworth,
former Justice, Court of Appeals, Fifth District of Texas at Dallas, participating by assignment.
*1 The appellant waived his right to a jury trial, entered a plea of not guilty to the felony offense of possession of cocaine, and was tried before the court.
The court found him guilty as charged, enhanced
with two prior felony convictions, and assessed punishment at confinement for ten years in prison. At
issue is the legality of the warrantless search and the
sufficiency of evidence to support the conviction.

On November 5, 1996, Officer Calvin Johnson went
to the Fantasy Motel Inn with several other officers to
serve a grand jury subpoena on the appellant. The
officers were members of the "Achilles Group"
which focuses on three-time, violent offenders and
investigates felons that are armed or dealing in guns.
The Achilles Group was investigating the appellant in
connection with a case involving illegal possession of
firearms.
The officers asked the manager if the appellant was at
the motel. The manager told them that the appellant
was in room 105 and gave them a receipt which
showed that appellant had rented room 105. The officers knocked on the door to room 105 and announced
that they were Houston police officers. They knocked
several times and waited several minutes. During that
time, the officers could hear male and female voices
whispering and they could hear someone moving
around the room. A woman peered through the window coverings and asked them what they wanted.
They repeated that they were police officers and told
her they needed to talk to the appellant. She told them
to wait while she dressed.
Two more minutes passed before the woman opened
the door. She stepped outside the door and told them
the appellant was in the bathroom. Officer Johnson
testified that he smelled a strong odor of burning
marijuana as soon as the woman opened the door. He
heard the sound of the toilet flushing, and he could
hear water running in the sink. The officers called for
the appellant several times. The appellant came out of
the bathroom with his hands over his head and lowered himself to the ground. The officers entered the
room to secure it and to be certain there were no
other people in the room and no weapons within the
appellant's reach.
Officer Johnson testified that near the bathroom he
smelled fresh marijuana. He looked in the bathroom
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and saw a green, leafy substance swirling around in
the toilet bowl which he recognized as marijuana.
The water was still running in the sink. He turned off
the water and, with the aid of his flashlight, saw a
glass vial in the drain hole which he recognized as a
"crack pipe." The officers dismantled a portion of the
plumbing associated with the sink to retrieve the
pipe. A white, powdery substance found in the pipe
proved to be cocaine.
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Houston ri st Dist.] 1997, pet, refd) (a motel room is
the equivalent of a home in the context of search and
seizure law). To justify a warrantless search, the State
must demonstrate probable cause existed at the time
the search was made, and the existence of exigent
circumstances which made the procuring of a warrant
impracticable. TEX.CODE CRIM. P. ANN, art.
14.05 (Vernon Supp.1999).
Probable Cause

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his first three points of error, the appellant complains of the denial of his motion to suppress evidence found in his motel room after a warrantless
search. The appellant argues that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the officers' search of
the motel room. He alternatively argues that even if
there were exigent circumstances, the search was
nevertheless invalid because the officers should have
terminated the search once the appellant and the
premises were secured.
Standard of Review
*2 At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole
judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to
be given their testimony. Romero v. Stale, 800
S.W.2d 539. 543 rTex.Crim.App. 1990). Absent an
abuse of discretion, the trial court's findings should
not be disturbed. Covarrubia v. State. 902 S.W.2d
549, 553 (Tex.App.-Houston fist Distl 1995, pet,
refd). We do not engage in our own factual review.
Instead, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, we consider only
whether the trial court improperly applied the law to
the facts. Romero, 800 S.W.2d at 543; Covarrubia,
902S.W.2dat553.
The trial court found that the search of the appellant's
motel room was justified because the officers had
probable cause to believe the room contained evidence of a crime, and exigent circumstances existed
which made it impractical to obtain a warrant.
Warrantless Search
The officers conducted a search when they entered
the motel room without the consent of the appellant.
Taylor v. State, 945 S.W.2d 295. 298 n. 1 (Tei.App.-

Probable cause to search exists when reasonably
trustworthy facts and circumstances within the
knowledge of the officer on the scene would lead a
person of reasonable prudence to believe that the
instrumentality of a crime or evidence of a crime will
be found. McNairy v. State, 835 S.W.2d 101. 106
fTex.Crim.App.1991). In McNauy, the Court of
Criminal Appeals concluded that the police had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of defendant's mobile home where the police had detected the
odor of methamphetamine emanating from the home,
they had heard the back door of the home opening
and people running out the back, and they knew there
was another methamphetamine laboratory nearby.
McNairy, 835 S.W.2d at 106. The odor of marijuana
can supply probable cause for a warrantless arrest.
Is am
v. State,
582
S.W.2d
441, 444
(Tex.Crim.App.1979); Jackson v. Stale, 745 S.W.2d
394. 396 (Tex.App.-Houston fist Distl 1987, pet,
refd).
Here, Officer Johnson testified that he detected a
strong odor of burning marijuana as soon as the
woman opened the motel door. Bolh officers testified
that there was an odor of marijuana on or about her
person. Officer Johnson heard the appellant flushing
the toilet and running the water in the sink and believed that the appellant may have been destroying
contraband. Based on these facts, the officers had
probable cause to enter the motel room.
Exigent Circumstances
*3 The officers were justified in entering the motel
room without consent or a search warrant because
they had probable cause to believe marijuana was in
the room. Exigent circumstances are present where
an officer perceives a danger to himself or others, a
danger that the suspect will escape, or a danger that
evidence will be destroyed. McNairy, 835 S.W.2d at
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107. The officers could not determine whether a third
person was in the room or in the bathroom. Two officers testified that the appellant was under investigation for the illegal possession of a firearm, that he
was a three-time felon, having been convicted of violent crimes, and that he had been arrested for attempted murder. The officers heard the appellant
running water and flushing the toilet in the bathroom.
Combined with the odor of the marijuana, the delay
in opening the door, and the fact that the officers
heard the appellant and his female companion moving around and whispering, the sound of the running
water and flushing toilet gave the officers reason to
believe that evidence was being destroyed. The record supports a finding that a warrantless search of
the motel room was justified by exigent circumstances.
Protective Search
The seizure of the crack pipe and the marijuana was
permissible because the evidence was found in plain
view during a legitimate protective sweep pursuant to
a lawful investigative detention. A police officer in
circumstances short of probable cause for arrest may
justify temporary detention for the purpose of investigation which is a lesser intrusion upon personal
security than arrest. Ramirez v. State, 672 S.W.2d
480, 482 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). A temporary detention is justified when the detaining officer has specific articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, lead him to conclude that the person detained actually is, has been, or
soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Woods v.
State, 956 S.W.2d 33. 38 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).
The smell of burning marijuana justifies further investigation to determine whether an offense is being
committed in an officer's presence. Jackson, 745
S.W.2d at 395. The police were justified in detaining
the appellant and his companion on the basis of the
odor of burning marijuana in the room.
Officer Johnson testified he had reason to believe that
the appellant may have been in possession of weapons because that was the reason for the investigation.
An officer may conduct a limited search when an
officer has a reasonable belief, based on specific and
articulable facts, that a suspect is dangerous and may
gain immediate control of weapons. Michigan v.
Lone. 463 U.S. 1032, 1049. 103 S.Ct. 3469. 3480-81,
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77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983); Watson v. State, 861
S.W.2d 4\0 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1993, pet, refd). A
protective search for weapons may extend beyond the
person even in the absence of probable cause. Id.
*4 An officer may seize what he sees in plain view if
he is legally permitted to be at the place from which
the evidence is visible. Miller v. State, 608 S.W.2d
684, 685 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). Under the "plain
view" doctrine, a warrantless seizure by police of
private possessions is permitted when: (1) the police
officer lawfully makes the initial intrusion, and (2) it
is immediately apparent to the police officer that the
items he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. Green v.
State, 866 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex.App.-Houston fist
Dist.l 1993. no pet).
Officer Johnson lawfully looked into the bathroom
pursuant to a protective search following an investigative detention. He smelled an odor of fresh marijuana and saw marijuana swirling in the toilet bowl.
Turning off the water, Officer Johnson looked down
the drain in the sink where he saw a crack pipe in the
drain in plain view.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the motion to suppress. The appellant's first three
points of error are overruled.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his fourth and fifth points of error, the appellant
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
his conviction.
Standard of Review
The standard of review for legal sufficiency of evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Clewis v. State,
922 S.W.2d 126, 132 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (citing
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61
L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). The appellate court does not
review the fact finder's weighing of the evidence.
Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 134. In reviewing the factual
sufficiency of the evidence, the court of appeals
should not substitute its judgment for that of the fact
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finder and should set aside the judgment only if it is
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence
as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Clewis, 922
S.W.2dat129, 133.
Affirmative Link to Controlled Substance
The appellant argues that the evidence was legally
insufficient because he was not "affirmatively
linked" to the cocaine. To support a conviction for
the felony offense of possession of a controlled substance, the State had the burden to prove the appellant knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled substance. That is, that the appellant exercised
care, control, or management over the cocaine, and
that the appellant knew that what he was carrying
was contraband. Hurt ado v. State, 881 S.W.2d 738,
743 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.1 1994, pet, refd);
seeTEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§
481.102(3)(D), 481.115(a) (Vernon Supp.1999). Circumstantial evidence is sufficient if the combined and
cumulative effect of all incriminating circumstances
point to the defendant's guilt. Sosa v. State, 845
S.W.2d479, 483 (Tex.App.-Houston fist Dist.1 1993.
pet, refd). Evidence which affirmatively links the
appellant to the contraband in such a manner that a
reasonable inference arises that he knew of its existence and whereabouts is sufficient. Palmer v. State,
857 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex.App.-Houston fist Dist.1
1993, no pet).
*5 In determining if sufficient affirmative links exist,
a reviewing court can examine such circumstantial
factors as the amount of contraband found, its location in relationship to the defendant's personal belongings, the defendant's relationship to other persons
with access to the premises, incriminating statements,
and proximity of the defendant to the contraband.
Villegas v. State, 871 S.W.2d 894. 896 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.1 1994, pet, refd). Other facts to
consider include: 1) whether the defendant was at the
place searched at the time of the search; 2) whether
there were other persons present at the time of the
search; 3) whether the contraband was found in a
closet that contained men's clothing, if the defendant
is male; 4) whether the amount of contraband found
was large enough to indicate the defendant knew of
its existence; and 5) whether there is evidence establishing the defendant's occupancy of the premises.
Classe v. State, 840 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.1 1992. pet, refd).
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Here, the appellant rented the motel room in his
name. He had convenient access to the contraband,
the appellant was in the bathroom when his female
companion opened the door. The contraband was in
plain view, swirling in the toilet bowl and suspended
in the plumbing of the sink. The fact that the water
was still swirling in the toilet bowl and the water in
the sink was still running indicated that the appellant
was the person who put the contraband in those
places. Drug paraphernalia was in plain view, sitting
on the dresser in the motel room. The motel room and
the bathroom had a strong residual odor of marijuana,
both burnt and fresh. The appellant came out of the
bathroom with his hands raised and lowered himself
to the floor before the officers even asked him to do
so, indicating a consciousness of guilt.
The evidence was legally sufficient to support a finding that the appellant intentionally and knowingly
possessed the cocaine. The finding of guilt based on
the evidence is not so contrary to the overwhelming
weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and
unjust.
The appellant's fourth and fifth points of error are
overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.
Tex.App.-Hous. (1 Dist), 1999.
Watson v. State
Not Reported in S.W.2d, 1999 WL 21470 (Tex.App.Hous. (1 Dist.))
END OF DOCUMENT
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